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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS  
This dissertation provides new insights on stock market index reactions to the fiscal 
disclosure of public debt and governmental deficit, for every country in the eurozone, 
using annual panel data for the abnormal returns calculated from index prices from each 
country stock index over the period 2005-2016. For the research question: “What is the 
market reaction to the fiscal discloser of deficit in the eurozone?”, different models were 
tested, fixed-effects and random-effects models, GLS regressions, Tobit regressions for 
the independent variables: GDP variation, debt variation, deficit variation and a dummy 
variable to control for the financial crisis of 2008, fincrisi1. Other econometric tests were 
used for testing the dependent variable, being the day of the announcement, normality, 
heteroskedasticity and correlation with the following hypothesis: H0: The market shows 
a positive or negative reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public debt and governmental 
deficit; H1:The market has no reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public debt and 
governmental deficit.  
The stock index markets express a reaction to debt and deficit variation, since these 
variables presents statistical significance. Comprehensibly, the market reacts negatively 
to an increase in debt and deficit, most notably in the days closer to the event day.  
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Esta dissertação produz uma nova visão sobre as reações dos mercados financeiros à 
divulgação da divida publica e do défice governamental, para cada país na zona euro, 
usando dados anuais em painel para calcular os retornos anormais de cada índice de 
preços de cada país, no período entre 2005 e 2016. A pergunta de investigação é: “Qual 
é a reação do mercado à divulgação fiscal do défice na zona euro?”. Foram testados 
diferentes modelos, efeitos fixos, efeitos aleatórios, regressões GLS, regressões Tobit, 
para as variáveis independentes: variação do PIB, variação da divida, variação do défice 
e uma variável dummy para controlar o efeito da crise de 2008, fincrisis1. Outros testes 
econométricos foram utilizados para testar a variável dependente, o dia do anúncio: 
normalidade, hererocedasticidade, e correlação com as seguintes hipóteses, H0: o 
mercado mostra uma reação positiva ou negativa à divulgação da divida publica e ao 
défice governamental; H1: o mercado não reage à divulgação fiscal da dívida publica e 
ao deficit governamental. Os mercados financeiros demonstram uma reação negativa à 
variação da divida e à variação do défice, uma vez que essas variáveis apresentam alguma 
significância estatisticamente.   
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Over the last years, countries in European periphery have struggled to keep their 
deficit and public debt in the lowest values possible, or even acceptable, for the European 
union established norms and its institutions. These norms are established given the fact 
that the majority of these countries have as their national currency the euro, implemented 
in 1st January 2002 and now present in nineteen countries. These nineteen countries have 
distinctive cultures and subsequently different ways of controlling their economy. These 
differences are more noticeable between European regions, most notably North and 
South. An example of this are the low interest rates for northern prosperous countries and 
high interest rates for the southern countries, usually in recession, which is a factor for 
financial market investors. These are macroeconomic effects that do not help the 
prospects/projections of southern European markets.  
Public debt and governmental deficit became a more important focus after two 
occurrences: the construction of the European Union (EU) as an organization with its own 
institutions to supervise the European countries, that were constantly joining EU; and the 
monetary union, that pressured these countries to have balanced economies and public 
finances for “a common good” that is the EU being perceived and having a competitive 
market, as well as being a competitor against other strong economies, as United States 
and China.  
This pressure is applied with diplomatic agreements made between the state members 
and the EU, namely the “Stability and Growth Pact” (SGP) corrective arm/Excessive 
deficit procedure ensured that Member States adopt appropriate policy responses to 
correct excessive deficit (and/or debts) by implementing the Excessive Deficit procedure 
(EDP) (European Commission, 2019), this is only applied when a Member State that 
exceed the budgetary deficit 1(Eurostat, 2019), celling that is obligatory by the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact legislation, the procedure entails several steps, potentially 
culminating in sanctions to encourage a Member State to get its budget deficit under 
control, a requirement for the smooth functioning of Economic and monetary Union 
(Eurostat, 2019). Thus, for every State member or candidate countries there are two most 
 
1 Budgetary deficit occurs when a government’s expenditure is bigger than its revenue (Eurostat, 2019).  
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notable requests: the public debt must not exceed a 3% deficit of the gross domestic 
product (GDP); and public debt must not exceed 60% of the GDP. 
Another event that made these public debt and deficit such a discussed theme within 
the European union was the financial crisis of 2008, and the recovery afterwards. The 
differences between North of Europe and South of Europe became publicly clear, the 
growth was not the same between the two regions even though the main policies of the 
European union were the same. The SGP exists since 1997, taking over the Maastricht 
treaty celebrated in 1992, the 3% maximum deficit and 60% maximum debt of the GDP 
already existed, but it was only planning the way for the creation of the euro, since these 
measures can only be applied to countries with the same currency. In this case, the authors 
Alesina and Tabellini make a good argument about the policy makers within the 
countries, these individuals can play with the deficit and debt in a way that serves their 
interests and at margin of the EU, when a government is likely of losing the office, a large 
deficit transfer to the next successor. (…) If the current policymakers support the defence 
of spending and future government has inclinations for social spending, they can increase 
the deficit, accumulate more debt and thereby, influence its successors to reduce their 
social expenditure in order to service the debt (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). 
Financial markets obtained great power in countries’ economies with the monetary 
union. Countries with a fragile economic balance face the increase of the interest rates 
that have led to extreme measures of austerity subsequently leading to a fiscal crisis 
(Grauwe, 2013).  
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question: “What is the market 
reaction to the fiscal discloser of deficit in the eurozone?”. In other words, analyze the 
impact on market indexes of public debt and governmental deficit disclosures in countries 
within the Eurozone, whether there is a connection between these two subjects and if they 
react favorably or not to debt and deficit rise/fall. 
The market reaction is observed through the abnormal returns (AR) calculated from 
the stock market indexes from each country within the eurozone, for example PSI20 for 
Portugal and DAX for Germany. 
These stock market indexes represent a set of companies that are valued within this 
index, the index may vary in agreement with the stock from each company and with the 
JOANA PELEIAS DE CARVALHO  MFW IN FINANCE AT ISEG 
x 
 
actual trades. However, each index has a way of calculating the weighted-average stock 
price of all stocks that make up the index. The last price taken is the ‘price close’, meaning 
the lasting available price. 
Regarding the dividends, the indexes do not pay dividends, nevertheless they are 
indeed affected by the companies within the index that may contain ex-dividend date, and 
that may be reflected on the index.  
The literature is much interested in understanding the relationship between interest 
rates and business cycle shocks, failures in the eurozone with the creation of the central 
banks and the macroeconomic policies, private consumption, inflation, Euribor, and some 
of them correlate these variables with, for example, government debt and deficit and 
analyze the impact of them in the market. That being said, there is very little research in 
understanding the impact of the government deficit and debt disclosures in the markets.  
There is interest in predicting the market reaction to the fiscal indicators’ disclosure, 
to understand if the market reacts when the deficit or debt are higher or lower than what 
it was expected and perceived within the eurozone. If a struggling economy shows a 
deficit surplus, will the market react positively or negatively to this progression. 
It is determined that the stock index markets respond negatively to an increase of debt 
and deficit disclosure, this is further perceptible 5 days and 10 days after the day of the 
announcement.  
In the section 1 - Introduction a summary of the thesis is presented, what is focus of 
the study, the research question and the subject is presented in a more abstract way. In 
section 2 – Literature Review a review of the related research is presented. In section 3 – 
Methodology and data – data used is presented as well as the models applied. In Section 
4 – Analysis of Results the results of the most models and data used in the section 3 are 
stated. Section 5 – Conclusion, contributions, limitations and future investigation, the 
main conclusions are expressed, as well as the contribution of this thesis, the limitation 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
From 1970 to 2008, Checherita and Rother studied the relation between government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and per-capita GDP growth rate, in 12-euro area countries, analysing 
the non-linear relationship between debt and growth. There is a comparison made 
between peacetime and wartime debts. The authors refer Reinhart and Rogoff that stated 
that in peace time, the debt build-ups could be more problematic for future growth since 
they can be persistent for a longer timespan compared to war time debt. In a way, debt 
build ups can be important from an economic point of view. Between 2007-2010 the 
deficit ratio increased 0.7% of GDP in 2007, to 6.0% of GDP in 2010 (Checherita-
Westphal & Rother, 2010). Public debt is also found to have a non-linear impact on 
economic growth rate, private savings, as well as (…)  public investment and total factor 
productivity (Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2010). When estimated individually, public 
debt can affect economic growth rate through numerous channels simultaneously. 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) provided another perspective on government debt, 
stating that this can become a political instrument for the policymaker to influence future 
choices, and also that budget deficits and debt accumulation can have different purposes: 
provide means of reallocating income over time and through generations. When a 
government is likely of losing the office, a large deficit transfer to the next successor is 
likely, specifically if they have different preferences in regard to the allocation of 
spending. Thus, if the current policymakers support the defence of spending and future 
government has inclinations for social spending, they can increase the deficit, accumulate 
more debt and thereby, influence its successors to reduce their social expenditure in order 
to service the debt.  
The authors follow a model with a constant population of individuals in the same time 
horizon that represent voters, workers and consumers, having obvious differences in 
tastes, especially in goods delivered by the state. Then, two political parties are chosen 
by the policymaker and each party maximizes the utility function of the consumers. The 
paper indicates the variance in debt policies can be explained by the differences in 
political institutions, this varies between countries, especially the change in governments 
and how difficult it can be to manage public debt with constant switch of political parties. 
Briefly, published papers show that fiscal deficits are a result of political conflicts. 
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Sgherri and Zoli explore the critical impact of the financial crisis in the euro area 
economy and what markets perceived of this event as discrimination between some 
government issuers, since sovereign risk premium were spreading even with a low risk 
of default. These government issuers required total higher risk premiums. With the euro 
as a unique currency, the sovereign risk premium differentials have raised doubts about 
the ability of the financial markets provide discipline across the euro area (Sgherri & 
Zoli, 2009). The paper analyses a change throughout time in euro area of sovereign bond 
markets and the modifications in the investors’ appetite, through a theoretical model. It 
also studies the changes on bond spreads of the euro area since it has the advantage of 
controlling other factors, and also influence the spreads outside the monetary union, in 
the behaviour of sovereign’s spreads. The paper concludes that the financial markets 
responded to the decline in fiscal position by the requirement of higher sovereign default 
risk premiums in most countries. In a country specific development, there is increasing 
predictable debt levels and at the same time, a rising concern about the solvency of 
national banking systems. The eurozone is now more concerned and disciplined with 
national fiscal and financial market policies, than before the crisis. The authors 
recommend various aspects to prevent future financial crisis, for example some structural 
reforms to enhance growth and possible revenue predictions, declaring that this measure 
can predict and prevent for the future but doesn’t support the tomorrow’s vicious domestic 
debt dynamics (Sgherri & Zoli, 2009). 
Coccia analyses public debts and government deficits in European countries, stating 
that public debt is a critical problem for countries with a fragile economy, since it can 
cause instability and sovereign debt crisis; also, high public debt-to-GDP ratio is 
considered an issue for policymakers since it has a negative effect in the capital markets 
and reduces investments, employment and economic growth in the long run. 
Coccia formulates two research questions: (1) How is the evolution of public debt 
across European countries, before and after the introduction of the euro currency? (2) 
Have countries within European Monetary Union (EMU) an evolution of the public debt 
similar or different to other countries? (Coccia, 2018). 
The authors answer to the first question states that general government gross debt as 
a percentage of GDP has increased from 2001 to 2014 for countries inside the EMU 
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compared to the countries outside the EMU. Referring to the differences in the evolution 
of the public debt, Coccia affirms that within EMU, an austere deterioration of general 
government deficit as a percentage of GDP was experienced, with an arithmetic mean of 
-3.83 in 2003/04, in comparison to countries outside EMU with an average value of -1.32, 
in the same period. 
Coccia also concludes that countries within EMU have higher levels of current taxes 
on income, wealth as a percentage of GDP, and taxes on production and imports as a 
percentage of GDP than countries outside the EMU, relating this to the guidelines of 
Maastricht Treaty, The Stability and Growth Pact, etc. Coccia makes a future scenario 
that may negatively affect the public debt, employment and economic growth, being the 
current problematic evolution of economic and demographic factors (Coccia, 2018). 
Grauwe and Ji (2013) observe that in 2007 the governments saw their debt levels rise 
intensely, with the authors analysing US, UK and the Eurozone. They observed that, since 
2007, the increase in the debt to GDP ratios was faster in the US and UK than in the 
Eurozone. As the authors state, the eurozone was the one that ultimately experienced a 
severe sovereign debt crisis and not the US or the UK. 
In this paper Grauwe and Ji tried to better explain fragility theory of the Eurozone: an 
empirical test theory made by Grauwe in 2011, that was better tested in this paper. This 
fragility that Grauwe refers to is related to government bond markets in a monetary union 
and the vulnerability to self- fulfilling liquidity crisis, comparing to a self-governing 
country. The self-governing country can issue money and give a guarantee to the 
bondholder that the cash will be available at maturity, unlike a monetary union member, 
that cannot provide any guarantee because its more susceptible to the negative market 
sentiment that can create a liquidity crisis. The authors confirm this hypothesis, having 
found evidence that there’s a big part of the flow of the spread from the peripheral 
eurozone countries.  
The authors also discovered evidence that debt to GDP ratio is important to investors, 
and that the high ratios of debt in the eurozone and the increase of the spreads, are 
progressively more important. It is also stated that the austerity implemented in countries 
that were affected by a liquidity-crisis, may force them into a recession. Therefore, there 
is a reduction of effectiveness in this policy of austerity. 
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Lukmanova and Tondl (2016) investigate the effect of business cycle synchronization 
(BCS) within the European monetary union, confirming that it had been varying 
considerably. The BCS was high when there was economic stability between 2002 and 
2003 and even higher in the economic crisis in 2008; questioning if the BCS in the 
eurozone can function optimally. 
International debt finance deficit, which is worse for the position of the international 
investment, accumulation of debt in the European area (EA) increases the interest level 
and can result in a debt crisis followed by a fall in an economic activity. The paper 
analyses the effect of macroeconomic imbalances inside the EA members, and the 
increasing imbalances in other members. The model centres on the effects on BCS arising 
from particularities: (1) competitiveness and current account imbalances; (2) imbalances 
on fiscal deficits and public and private debt; (3) imbalances in wages development; (4) 
decoupling. 
The authors formed various hypothesis to test the effects of the particularities from 
the score board indicators, that are summarized in the 4 particularities cited above. 
To conclude, the authors determine that the current account balance between the EA 
create a decoupling effect on BCS that has grown after the crisis. The study also affirms 
that the fiscal policies in public debt among EA members don’t contest BCS, since they 
are divergent and it’s difficult to implement an appropriate fiscal policy to all members, 
it wouldn’t be suitable. Thus, the authors affirm that the BCS would reduce 
unemployment and inflation which are important for differences in government deficits; 
the differences in public debt through the EA after the crisis didn’t weaken BCS, since 
there was a difference in debt prior to the crisis and an unequal output growth, and after 
the crisis the growth frequency was reduced in all countries. The authors also conclude 
different relations: (1) there was accumulation of debt in countries of the periphery that 
produced unequal growth rates during the prosperous times, by consequence the private 
debt level led to a deeper recession in countries that already had high private debt; (2) 
there is a negative relation between private debt accumulation and BCS over different 
times of the Business Cycle (BC); (3) endogeneity was found between BCS and 
differences in private debt levels, since there is a negative effect of private debt 
differences for BCS. The estimations made by the authors also found that members from 
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the EA with divergent wage developments lead to decoupling of BC proper to demand 
effects. 
Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak (2013) developed a pricing model of sovereign 
risk for a large number of countries, within and outside Europe, before and after the 
financial crisis of 2008, based on the fiscal space and other economic fundamentals such 
as: (1) foreign interest rate, (2) external debt, (3) trade openness, (4) nominal depreciation, 
(5) inflation, (6) GDP/Capita and (7) economic growth; with the purpose of explaining 
the CDS (Credit Default Swaps) spreads and determine if the market pricing of risk is 
comparable or not with the affected European countries and other countries outside 
Europe and determine if there are systematically large prediction errors for the CDS 
spreads during the financial crisis of 2008 and in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe appeared. 
By matching the SWEAP (South West European Periphery) with 5 middle income 
countries outside Europe that were similar in terms of fiscal space (debt/tax) during the 
crisis, the authors concluded that SWEAP default risk is priced much higher than the 
matched countries in 2010, since the authors in order to validate that fiscal space (being 
an important determinant of market-based sovereign risk) found prediction errors in 
pricing SWEAP risk, since in 2008 it was surprisingly high. Also, other OECD countries 
tended to have very high prediction errors, meaning high CDS spreads when compared 
with the model predictions. 
The paper written by Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos argues that euro 
facilitated large flows of capital and a financial bubble in peripherical countries, 
economic reforms were abandoned, institutions deteriorated, the response to the credit 
bubble was delayed, and the growth prospects of these countries declined (Fernandez-
Villaverde, Garicano, & Santos, 2013). The authors focus on five specific countries: 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Germany, and analyse how the dynamics functioned 
in these distinctive countries, by dynamics meaning: abandonment of economic reforms 
and debt extension from excessive borrowing. 
The authors, make an observation regarding the economic reform: with the arrival of 
the euro it was expected when national governments needed monetary autonomy and had 
limited fiscal autonomy, they would suffer pressure to adopt structural reforms that they 
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had already refused to adopt, but in its place countries in the periphery of Europe had 
their interest rates dropped and the same for the exchange rate risk. 
 
  
JOANA PELEIAS DE CARVALHO  MFW IN FINANCE AT ISEG 
xvii 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In order to assess the impact in the market of fiscal indicators such as public debt and 
deficit, the stock index from each country within the eurozone was used. The stock prices 
of each index were analyzed, between 2005 to 2016, fifteen days ahead and fifteen days 
prior to the announcement day of the fiscal indicator by each government, taking into 
account the weekend days and holidays where the market is closed. 
 Abnormal returns (AR) were calculated for each stock index in the time period for 
each country. The AR are correlated with the returns that exceed the normal returns or 
the expected returns, in this case the level of immersion the index of each country in 
systematic risk. Thus, positive market reaction should give a positive AR result, meaning 
that the investors value the new information and increases future perspectives. Therefore, 
the rate of return is adjusted by subtracting the expected return from the actual, to thus 
obtain the AR the calculation was:  
R1=!(t1/t2)-1$*100 
Where,  
 𝑅& daily rate of return of stock market2 on the day after the announcement day;  
 𝑡& is the last price of the stock market on the day after the announcement day; 
 𝑡( is the last price of the stock market on the announcement day.  
Thus, our daily AR series includes 31 observations since it goes from time period of 
t-15 to t+15, for each country, a total of 6,671 observations for the calculated abnormal 
returns.   
The generation of the ARk is for 10 days, 5 days, and 1 day prior to the event, and 1 
day, 5 days and 10 days after the event. Subscript k is used to classify these events at -1, 
-5, -10, and 1, 5, 10 respectively. 
 
 
2 Prices from each stock market: Austria – ATX; Belgium – BEL 20; Cyprus – CYSMAIN; Estonia – 
OMXBBGI; Finland – OMXH25; France – CAC 40; Germany – DAX; Greece – ASE; Ireland – ISEQ; Italy 
– FTSE MIB; Latvia – OMXRGI; Lithuania – OMXVGI; Luxembourg – LUXXX; Malta – MSE; Netherlands 
– AEX; Portugal - PSI20; Slovakia – SAX; Slovenia – SBITOP; Spain – IBEX.  
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By analyzing the abnormal returns proximate to the event day, the uncertainty 
concerning the real date of the event is somewhat controlled. In this sample, the analysis 
considers the announcement day as when the public debt and governmental deficit is 
disclosed in the month of April, however the announcement day is the day considered as 
the dependent variable more studied during this work since the announcement was before 
the closing time of the stock exchange. Also, the effect may spread over the days that 
surround the event day  and the examination of abnormal returns allows the researcher to 
apprehend the cumulative effect of an event, this may happen due to the accessibility of 
information over the period, and the interpretation of the event’s impact in a future 
perspective.   
The main hypothesis was established in order to give some answers to the tests and to 
the research question:  
H0 = The market shows a positive or negative reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public 
debt and governmental deficit.  
H1 = The market has no reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public debt and 
governmental deficit. 
To test the dependent variable as well as the residuals and their normality, one used a 
fixed effects model regression, Kernel density and Shapiro-Wilk test.  
The dependent variable is the r0, the day of the announcement, and following the 
fixed effects model it specifies:  
(1) 𝒚𝒊𝒕  =  𝛽&	𝜲𝟏,𝒊𝒕 + ⋯+ 𝛽5	𝜲𝒌,𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼8 +	𝒖𝒊𝒕 
 𝑦8; – is the dependent variable, the day of the announcement, observed for a country 
i at time t; 
𝛸&,8; – is the time invariant 1 × k, with k being the number of independent variables, 
regressor vector. The independent variables are six: debt, the variation of the debt, the 
variation of GDP, the variation of deficit, the deficit variation if negative and deficit 
surplus, a dummy variable: fincrisis1, fincrisis2 and fincrisis3.  
𝛽 – is the k × 1 matrix of the parameters; 
𝛼8 – is the time-invariant that is unobservable individual effect, country for example.  
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𝑢8;  – is the error term.  
The GDP is an important variable since public debt and deficit data come as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product, this is easily explained since the GDP is a 
monetary measure of production of all gross values added, including institutions absorbed 
in production and services, as well as taxes (OECD, 2002); for example governmental 
deficit as a percentage of the GDP is described if a country needs to incur in more debt 
or can it pay to his creditors with the services and goods produced. GDP has a variable is 
tested with the calculated variation, having the GDP data between 2005 and 2016 for each 
country. The variable used for this is the GDP_var. 
Governmental deficit is defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as a balance of income and expenditure of the government, this 
including the capital income and capital expenditures, net lending means the government 
has a surplus, and is providing financial recourses to other sectors, while net borrowing 
mean the government has a deficit, and requires financial resources from other sectors 
(OECD, 2002), in a very simple way is the difference between income and expenses given 
a period of time, for which there are two possible outcomes: surplus or a deficit, surplus 
when we have a positive balance between income and expenditures, and deficit when the 
opposite happens. 
The variation of the variable deficit is calculated the same way as the GDP and debt, 
having two other indicators which are the deficit variation: negative and surplus. The 
deficit variation negative is given the values of 0 or 1, when the variable deficit_var is 
positive deficit variation negative takes the value of 0, and 1 otherwise. Deficit surplus 
takes the value of 0 or 1, when the variable deficit is positive the value is 0, otherwise is 
1.  
Public debt is the opposite of the governmental debt, it is not the difference between 
income and expenditures but all the external obligations that the government has as well 
as public sector agencies (OECD, 2002), OECD defines government debt in a more 
specific way: it’s a key indicator for the sustainability of government finance Debt is 
calculates as the sum of the: currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, 
pensions and standardized grantee schemes, and other accounts payable. Changes in 
government debt over time primarily reflect the impact of pact government deficits.  
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Public debt is tested with the variation of the variable debt, similar to GDP_var and 
deficit_var.  
Ultimately, as the dependent variable (AR) captures the market reaction, the 2008 
financial crisis effects are controlled with a dummy variable, fincrisis, for the financial 
crisis of 2008, taking the value of 0 before 2007 and 1 after this date. This first financial 
crisis variable is intentional to capture if there are any effects of the financial crisis 
perceived before 2008. fincrisis2 is an alternative dummy variable for the 2008 financial 
crisis, taking the value of 0 before 2008 and 1 after this date. This dummy variable is 
intended to capture whether the effect of the 2008 financial crisis affected the stock 
market values in that year, or just later on. fincrisis3 is another alternative dummy variable 
for the 2008 financial crisis, taking the value of 0 before 2009, and 1 after this date. The 
results of using the three variables are similar, the financial crisis is also expected to have 
some impact in the results, increasing the market reaction (due to the collapse of the stock 
markets). 
The Kernel Density is a non-parametric test, used to estimate the probability density 
function of a variable. It’s beneficial to make a comparison between different groups and 
to compare a benchmark density such as the normal (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). It’s non-
parametric test because it does not assume several underlying distributions for the 
variable, so figure 2 shows the kernel density distribution for the dependent variable.  
Shapiro-Wilk test can tell if a random sample derives from a normal distribution, the 
test provides the W value, as its presented in table 1, when this value represents a small 
number, it indicates that the sample it’s not normally distributed. This test has only two 
possible outputs, the sample is normal distributed, or it is not normal distributed.     
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics. For the residuals, observable in figure 3, 
the normal probability is approximately linear, thus the error terms are normally 
distributed. Figure 1 shows that all dependent variables show proximity to a normal 
distribution.   
For the independent variables several tests were performed, multicollinearity, 
heteroskedastic, B-Pagan, Wald test, Ramsey test, specification link test and fixed effects 
and robust GLS regressions.  
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The Multicollinearity test was performed to see the correlation present between all 
independent variables, knowing that if there is multicollinearity between the variables the 
model can be linearly predicted. The test shows multicollinearity between the variables.  
Heteroskedasticity assumes that the modeling error are uniform and uncorrelated, to 
test for heteroskedasticity it was used the Shapiro-Wilk test, in table 2 its observable 
normality and it is confirmed no heteroscedasticity.  
Breusch-Pagan was tested for heteroskedasticity, similar to the previous test. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that the residuals are homoskedastic, the Breusch-Pagan test 
suggest the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the model, contradicting the previous test, 
as it is observable in table 2.  
However, a way to correct this is to use heteroskedasticity-robust Standard Errors 
regression, goes against heteroscedasticity, heteroskedastic-consistent estimate of the 
asymptotic variance matrix of the OLS estimator, and it leads to standard errors that are 
called heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, or even more simply robust standard 
errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
To test the independent variables the Wald test was used, to better understand if the 
model is robust with these variables, in a way to discover if the variables are explanatory 
and the model is significant, the Wald test gives us the F value and the probability of F. 
The F value is a ratio of the sum of mean squares of the regression divided by the sum of 
mean square errors, its value varies from zero to a subjectively big number. The value of 
the probability of F value or Prob(F) is the probability of the null hypothesis being true 
for the whole model, in this specific test for the Prob(F) is 0.000 meaning all coefficients 
of the independent variables are zero. Moreover, the Wald test says, “some parameter 
equals some value”, this way all our variables equal 0, as it’s presented in table 3, meaning 
the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Ramsey test allows for testing if non-linear patterns of fitted valued may explain the 
dependent variable, thus the objective of the Ramsey test is: if the independent variables 
have any power to explain the dependent variable, the model can be misspecified meaning 
the data may be estimated by a polynomial or another non-linear function. The null 
hypothesis is only rejected when the F-test is zero. In this test, the null hypothesis of the 
research question is rejected.  
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The linktest was tested to observe the relation between the independent variable and 
the dependent variable. The linktest is a test of specification for the dependent variable, 
we may interpret this test as: if the independent variables are stated imperfectly. Linktest 
is observed by hatsq, a variable given by STATA, the value of the test must be significant, 
bigger than 0.05. In this case our variable is well stated.  
Concluded the tests, linear models were applied: fixed effects model and random-
effects GLS regressions, as well as the regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.  
The fixed effects regression is an estimation method that allows one to control for 
time-invariant unobserved individual features that can be correlated with the known 
independent variables, for unobserved individual heterogeneity that may be correlated 
with regressors. Such unobserved heterogeneity leads to omitted variables bias that could 
in principle be corrected by instrumental variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
For this fixed effect regression model, the dependent variable is maintained: r0, the 
day of the announcement and the dependent variables are the GDP variation, debt 
variation, deficit variation and the dummy variable fincrisis1. The formula is the same as 
(1) with the differences in variables being:  
 𝑦8; – is the dependent variable, the day of the announcement, observed for a country 
i at time t; 
𝑋&,8;– is the time invariant 1 × k, being k the number of independent variables, 
regressor vector. The independent variables are four: the variation of the debt, the 
variation of GDP, the variation of deficit, fincrisis1. 
𝛽 – is the k × 1matrix of the parameters; 
α8 – is the time-invariant that is unobservable individual effect, country for example.  
𝑢8;  – is the error term.  
In this first regression only fixed effects are controlled, with 209 observation. The t-
values tests the hypothesis that every coefficient is different from 0. To be able to reject 
this, the t-values has to be higher than 1.96 for a 95% confidence interval, in this case it’s 
conceivable to affirm the variable has effect on the dependent variable. The greater the t-
value, greater the significance of the variance.  
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The two-tail p-values test the hypothesis that every coefficient is unlike from 0, to be 
able to reject this the p-value must be lower than 0.05 for a 95% confidence interval, in 
this case the variable has significant influence on the dependent variable. The only 
variable that shows significance is the GDP variation.  
The Random effects model follows the following equation: 
(2) 𝒀𝒊𝒕  =  𝛽𝜲𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼 +	𝒖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
The random effects model is, unlike the fixed effects model, the variation across 
entities. And its presumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or the 
independent variables. This equation varies from the fixes effects since it has the	𝑢𝑖𝑡 is 
the random effects and the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the individual-specific random effect. Thus, if Yit be the 
dependent variable r0, and i = country at the t = year. 
𝛼 – is the unidentified intercept for each individual effect; 
𝑢8; – is the r0, specific random effect, measuring the difference between the average 
of the stock market index per country with stock market index per year; 
𝜀8; – is the individual-specific random effect, this case the derivation of the stock 
market index per country from the average for the stock index per year. 
For these random effects one added “robust” to control for heteroskedasticity, and the 
other regression ensured the reference for the group variables “i. country” and “i. year”, 
this way this variables are listed, so it’s more perceptible to observe which one has more 
significance through countries and years.  
The Driscoll-Kraay regression is performed for pooled OLS estimators. The Driscoll-
Kraay regression assumes the error structure to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and 
with a possibility of correlation between sections; the standard errors are robust. In this 
regression the estimators are adjusted to use unbalanced and balanced panel datasets, 
correspondingly.  
The dependent variable is maintained: r0; the other variables are the same used in the 
linear model: the day of the announcement and the dependents variables are the GDP 
variation, debt variation, deficit variation and the dummy variable fincrisis1.  
Considering the linear regression model,  
JOANA PELEIAS DE CARVALHO  MFW IN FINANCE AT ISEG 
xxiv 
 
(3) 𝑦8 	= 	𝚾′𝒊𝒕	𝜃 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
- 𝑦8 – represents the dependent variable; 
- 𝚾′𝒊𝒕 – represents the vector of the independent variables, with the first 
element being 1; 
- 𝜃 – represents another vector, but for the unknown coefficients 
- I and t – represent cross section units and time, country and year, 
respectively. 
Knowing that the model is under normal distribution, a Tobit regression can be 
applied, truncation and censoring arise most often in econometrics in the linear 
regression model with normally distributed error (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005), meaning 
the dependent variables can be censored in some way: with left-truncation or right-
truncation.  
The data cannot be observable in two ways: by truncation or censoring. By truncating 
data, some of the observation on the dependent variable and the regressors are lost; for 
censored data, the information about the dependent variable is lost, but not the data on 
the regressors, thus way truncation entails greater information loss than does censoring 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The left-censored at zero can have the dependent variable 
equal to zero, or bigger than zero, this suppresses the dependence on the independent 
variables giving a linear mean. Since the dependent variable is the abnormal returns on 
the day of the announcement, and a stock price can never be negative, thus the data is left 
censored.   
The Tobit regression is as follows (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005):  
(4) 𝑦 ∗   =  𝒙′𝛽 + 𝜀, 3 
where the error term, 
(5) 𝜀	~	𝑁[0, 𝜎(] 
 
3  𝒙′𝛽 – represents a matrix for a linear regression the regressor, similar to regression 
(4).  
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For the tobit regression the dependent variable is the announcement day and the 
independent variables are the GDP variation, public debt, governmental deficit, and the 








4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This is the final section of the main text. The maximum length is 10 per cent of the 
textual part, i.e. 3.5 pages. 
Regarding the research question: What is the market reaction to the fiscal discloser of 
deficit in the eurozone?”, with the following hypothesis: 
H0 = The market shows a positive or negative reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public 
debt and governmental deficit.  
H1 = The market has no reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public debt and 
governmental deficit. 
In figure 1, the results for the dependent variables (AR) are presented for the r0, the 
day of the announcement, rr5 that represents 5 days after the day of the announcement, 
and rr10 that is 10 days after the day of the announcement.  
The principal dependent variable is the r0, even though all variables show normal 
distribution the r0 is the day of the announcement which makes more sense to be the 
principal dependent variable, to see what the effect on the day of this disclosure is.  
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Note: in these histograms the dependent variables tested are r0, rr5 and rr10, the day 
of the announcement, 5 days after the announcement day, and 10 days after the 
announcement day. There’s significance concentration around 0. 
 
Figure 2 – Kernel Density Estimate  
Note: shows the normality under the kernel density estimate for the dependent 
variable r0. Shows a close normal distribution of a kernel density estimate, comparison 
is not meaningful. 
Figure 2 shows the normal distribution of the principal dependent variable, r0 under 
the kernel density estimate. In figure 3 it’s possible to observe the residuals normality of 
the dependent variable, that show a close normality for the error terms. The normal 
probability of the residuals is approximately linear; hence the error terms are normally 
distributed.  
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The same tests that were performed for r0, were also performed for the other 
dependent variables to see if any effects would be of notice.  
The first conclusion that can be taken is that the dependent variable is normal 
distributed, as well as the other possible dependent variables, rr0 and rr10, as is observed 
in Figure 1. 
For the independent variables which are: GDP, governmental deficit and public debt, 
and the dummy variable fincrisis1. The variables of control are the GDP and the dummy 
variables for the financial crisis.  
Following the tests for the independent variables several tests were implemented to 
observe if heteroskedasticity was present in the independent variables and if they 
presented normality. In figure 4 the test shows normality for the independent variables 
with the Prob>z being lower than 0.05, but the variables might be heteroskedastic. 
Breusch-Pagan test confirms the Shapiro-Wilk test, there is heteroskedasticity present in 
the variables.  
The heteroskedasticity was corrected, using the random model in the regressions, with 
the robust command in STATA, with heteroskedasticity-robust Standard Errors 
regression, goes against heteroscedasticity.   
 
 
Table 1 - Shapiro- Wilk test 
 
 
Table 2 - Breusch-Pagan Test 
end of do-file
. 
          r0          227    0.88485     19.187     6.841    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0009
         chi2(1)      =    11.02
         Variables: fitted values of r0
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 




Table 3 - Wald Test 
In figure 6 the Wald-Test is presented and its possible to conclude that the model is 
robust, and the variables are explanatory. The value of the probability of F value or 
Prob(F) is the probability of the null hypothesis being true for the whole model, all 
variables are equal to zero, meaning that it’s possible to reject the null hypothesis of the 
research question and conclude that the market has no reaction to the fiscal disclosure of 
the public debt and governmental deficit. 
The tests were concluded for the independent variables, so the models applied given 
the results are fixed-effects model and random-effects GLS regressions, as well as the 
regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and tobit regressions. 
For r0 we can observe in Table 4 the GDP variation shows significance; in Table 5 
fincrisis1 has significance, thus the control variables have significance. In Table 6 none 
of the variables show significance. Thus, we may reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that on the day of the 
announcement the markets do 
not react to the fiscal indicators 
disclosure.  
 
Table 4 – Fixed effects GLS 
regression for r0 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  6,   202) =    7.28
 ( 6)  fincrisis3 = 0
 ( 5)  fincrisis2 = 0
 ( 4)  fincrisis1 = 0
 ( 3)  deficit_var = 0
 ( 2)  debt2_var = 0
 ( 1)  gdp_var = 0
F test that all u_i=0: F(18, 186) = 0.83                     Prob > F = 0.6622
                                                                              
         rho     .0706186   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4225739
     sigma_u    .39213663
                                                                              
       _cons     .4395191   .3690317     1.19   0.235    -.2885067    1.167545
  fincrisis1     .0673708   .3586325     0.19   0.851    -.6401395    .7748811
 deficit_var    -.0434237   .0325707    -1.33   0.184    -.1076792    .0208319
   debt2_var    -.0260907   .0193151    -1.35   0.178    -.0641954     .012014
     gdp_var     -4.59325   2.087914    -2.20   0.029    -8.712286   -.4742138
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0611                        Prob > F          =     0.0934
                                                F(4,186)          =       2.02
     overall = 0.0355                                         max =         11
     between = 0.0001                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.0416                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        209




Table 5 – Random effects GLS robust regression for r0 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.3068125
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .9975214   .2330435     4.28   0.000     .5407645    1.454278
              
       2016             0  (omitted)
       2015      .5461396   .4023528     1.36   0.175    -.2424574    1.334737
       2014      .0918856   .2971404     0.31   0.757    -.4904989    .6742701
       2013     -.2067609   .3106498    -0.67   0.506    -.8156233    .4021016
       2012      .4981132   .4776679     1.04   0.297    -.4380987    1.434325
       2011      .2901053   .4549953     0.64   0.524     -.601669     1.18188
       2010     -.3288882   .4189539    -0.79   0.432    -1.150023    .4922463
       2009      .1211128   .2480431     0.49   0.625    -.3650428    .6072683
       2008      2.092423   .6193796     3.38   0.001     .8784615    3.306385
       2007      .7794666   .4688612     1.66   0.096    -.1394844    1.698418
        year  
              
      Spain     -.9600947   .0694375   -13.83   0.000     -1.09619   -.8239998
   Slovenia     -.0527763   .0803056    -0.66   0.511    -.2101724    .1046197
   Slovakia      -.106263   .1162014    -0.91   0.360    -.3340136    .1214877
   Portugal     -.9275896   .0923627   -10.04   0.000    -1.108617    -.746562
Netherlands      -.496732   .0263174   -18.87   0.000    -.5483132   -.4451509
      Malta     -.2835626   .0817484    -3.47   0.001    -.4437866   -.1233387
 Luxembourg     -.0706112   .0646633    -1.09   0.275     -.197349    .0561267
  Lithuania     -.2424718   .0974149    -2.49   0.013    -.4334014   -.0515422
     Latvia      .5217166   .1174856     4.44   0.000      .291449    .7519842
      Italy     -.7195874   .0466854   -15.41   0.000    -.8110891   -.6280858
    Ireland     -.4540407   .1046872    -4.34   0.000    -.6592238   -.2488576
     Greece      .2230775   .1198235     1.86   0.063    -.0117723    .4579272
    Germany      .0613507   .0272194     2.25   0.024     .0080016    .1146998
     France     -.9648388   .0293862   -32.83   0.000    -1.022435   -.9072429
    Finland     -.3621333   .0149564   -24.21   0.000    -.3914473   -.3328193
    Estonia     -.2340958   .0858722    -2.73   0.006    -.4024022   -.0657895
     Cyprus     -.7160028   .0529091   -13.53   0.000    -.8197027    -.612303
    Belgium     -.2727282   .0131738   -20.70   0.000    -.2985484    -.246908
     country  
              
  fincrisis1      -.47527   .2499435    -1.90   0.057    -.9651502    .0146103
 deficit_var    -.0049403   .0244542    -0.20   0.840    -.0528696     .042989
   debt2_var    -.0246551   .0242046    -1.02   0.308    -.0720952    .0227851
     gdp_var    -7.530833   2.848498    -2.64   0.008    -13.11379   -1.947878
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in country)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(13)     =          .
     overall = 0.2832                                         max =         11
     between = 1.0000                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.2304                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        209










Table 6 - Driscoll-Kraay with fixed effects for r0 
For the relevant variables, deficit and debt, spots of significance start to appear 5 and 
10 days after the announcement.   
For debt variation, in Table 10, a random effects GLS regression for 5 days after the 
announcement day, shows that debt have some significance, however this represents a 
negative impact in the market. Table 15 and 21, random effects GLS regression and a 
tobit regression respectively, also show debt variation has significance after 10 days of 
the announcement day, nevertheless is also a negative impact in the stock market indexes. 
All tests have left-censored observations, meaning the dependent variable data was lost, 
only the data from the regressors was analyzed. 
For the deficit variation Table 11, 12 and 13 show deficit variation as a variable with 
statistical significance 5 days after the day of the announcement, first for a random effects 
GLS robust regression, and then for Driscoll-Kraay with fixed effects and without fixed 
effects. The deficit variation shows a negative impact in the stock market index 5 days 
after the announcement. However, for 10 days after, for the fixed effects GLS regression 
and random effects GLS regression the impact of deficit is also negative, as observable 
in Tale 14 and 16.  
We can conclude that on the day of the announcement, 5 days after and 10 days after, 
the markets display a response to the GDP variation, deficit and debt disclosure, even 
though these two variables represent some statistical significance, this is a negative 
impact that is represented in the markets, since all the coefficients observed are negative. 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4395191   .1588975     2.77   0.013     .1056878    .7733504
  fincrisis1     .0673708   .2145565     0.31   0.757    -.3833956    .5181372
 deficit_var    -.0434237   .0454916    -0.95   0.352     -.138998    .0521506
   debt2_var    -.0260907   .0160391    -1.63   0.121    -.0597876    .0076061
     gdp_var     -4.59325   2.324243    -1.98   0.064    -9.476303    .2898035
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.0416
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0009
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =      7.55
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209
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Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, and the alternative rejected: The market shows a 
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5. CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
This thesis focuses on the market reaction to the fiscal disclosure of public debt and 
governmental deficit. The market may react by an increase or a reduction on the market 
value of each company that is within each stock index for every eurozone country. To 
measure this reaction, the abnormal returns (AR) were used. The fiscal disclosure day is 
used as the reference for the AR and is measured for 10 and 5 days after the announcement 
day and for that very same day. All of these values are independent, since they are 
calculated over different periods of time.  
The research question to be answered is: “What is the market reaction to the fiscal 
disclosure of deficit in the eurozone?”.  
The models used to predict this behavior analyzed through the abnormal returns of 
the stock prices indexes were the fixed effects model, random-effects model, and GLS 
regression model, as well as the Driscoll-Kraay regression and Tobit regression.  
From the results obtained, one can observe that the stock index markets react to the 
GDP variation and dummy variable fincrisis1, used to try and control sudden changes in 
the markets (mainly financial crisis of 2008). The stock index markets are also shown to 
react to the debt and deficit variation, since these variables presents statistical 
significance. Understandably, the market reacts negatively to an increase in debt and 
deficit, most notably in the days closer to the event day (disclosure of debt and deficit 
values). 
Some limitations to the models developed are clearly identifiable such as the use of 
data for countries within the eurozone and for timespan between 2005 and 2016, which 
could be expanded in order to obtain a more robust analysis. The indicators prescribed 
previously were seen as the most relevant for the proposed study, but are not at all 
mandatory or exclusive, more detailed information regarding the financial markets as well 
as the countries themselves could benefit the outputs of the models used. Finally, the 
fiscal disclosure dates of governmental deficit and public debt are not the same for each 
country, in terms of data collection.  
To better understand how the markets, react to the fiscal disclosure, more studies are 
needed that cover this relationship between the markets and disclosure of the financial 
indicators, and perhaps more countries and longer timespans, yielding more observations, 
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could help to better analyze such behavior. Also useful for future research would be the 
comparison between countries.  
The indicators used are an interesting subject to approach the problem, but maybe add 
more that would be equivalent for example unemployment rate, nature of government, 
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Table 7 - Summary Descriptive Statistics 












Table 9 - Fixed Effects GLS regression for rr5 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .3973844   .1622336     2.45   0.025     .0565444    .7382245
  fincrisis1     .0961706   .1880235     0.51   0.615    -.2988522    .4911934
 deficit_var    -.0417637   .0427049    -0.98   0.341    -.1314834     .047956
   debt2_var     -.026081   .0179868    -1.45   0.164    -.0638699     .011708
     gdp_var    -4.150885   2.311558    -1.80   0.089    -9.007289    .7055188
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 Root MSE          =    1.4119
                                                 R-squared         =    0.0356
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0228
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =      3.70
Method: Pooled OLS                               Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209
F test that all u_i=0: F(18, 186) = 0.83                     Prob > F = 0.6622
                                                                              
         rho     .0706186   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4225739
     sigma_u    .39213663
                                                                              
       _cons     .4395191   .3690317     1.19   0.235    -.2885067    1.167545
  fincrisis1     .0673708   .3586325     0.19   0.851    -.6401395    .7748811
 deficit_var    -.0434237   .0325707    -1.33   0.184    -.1076792    .0208319
   debt2_var    -.0260907   .0193151    -1.35   0.178    -.0641954     .012014
     gdp_var     -4.59325   2.087914    -2.20   0.029    -8.712286   -.4742138
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0611                        Prob > F          =     0.0934
                                                F(4,186)          =       2.02
     overall = 0.0355                                         max =         11
     between = 0.0001                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.0416                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        209






Table 10 – Random Effects GLS regression for rr5  
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.5580178
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     2.149752    .523573     4.11   0.000     1.123568    3.175936
              
       2016             0  (omitted)
       2015     -.7042327   .4297151    -1.64   0.101    -1.546459    .1379935
       2014     -1.628703    .666948    -2.44   0.015    -2.935897   -.3215086
       2013      -.741887   .7875635    -0.94   0.346    -2.285483    .8017091
       2012     -1.241244   .5649274    -2.20   0.028    -2.348481   -.1340068
       2011     -1.086898   .6763923    -1.61   0.108    -2.412603    .2388066
       2010      .2294738   .5916173     0.39   0.698    -.9300748    1.389022
       2009      .4532474   1.027021     0.44   0.659    -1.559676    2.466171
       2008      3.271435   .8827012     3.71   0.000     1.541372    5.001497
       2007      2.575189   1.109864     2.32   0.020     .3998967    4.750482
        year  
              
      Spain      .9861391   .2902878     3.40   0.001     .4171856    1.555093
   Slovenia      .6666706   .2822488     2.36   0.018     .1134732    1.219868
   Slovakia     -1.023065   .2313129    -4.42   0.000     -1.47643   -.5696998
   Portugal     -.1304228   .3109824    -0.42   0.675    -.7399372    .4790915
Netherlands      .3277813    .055706     5.88   0.000     .2185995    .4369631
      Malta     -.5329245   .1985248    -2.68   0.007     -.922026    -.143823
 Luxembourg     -.1896649   .1233422    -1.54   0.124    -.4314112    .0520814
  Lithuania     -.5268031   .2068001    -2.55   0.011    -.9321238   -.1214824
     Latvia     -.2905552    .263242    -1.10   0.270       -.8065    .2253895
      Italy      .9960206    .103408     9.63   0.000     .7933446    1.198697
    Ireland      1.089474   .3114102     3.50   0.000      .479121    1.699826
     Greece     -1.923703   .3472269    -5.54   0.000    -2.604255   -1.243151
    Germany      -.810456   .1065259    -7.61   0.000    -1.019243   -.6016691
     France     -.3067684   .1029824    -2.98   0.003    -.5086102   -.1049267
    Finland     -.3484491   .0710214    -4.91   0.000    -.4876484   -.2092497
    Estonia     -.1838409   .1564487    -1.18   0.240    -.4904748     .122793
     Cyprus     -1.080801    .178467    -6.06   0.000     -1.43059   -.7310126
    Belgium     -.1449047   .0331126    -4.38   0.000    -.2098042   -.0800052
     country  
              
  fincrisis1    -1.137844   .5428837    -2.10   0.036    -2.201877    -.073812
 deficit_var     .0159472   .0814991     0.20   0.845     -.143788    .1756824
   debt2_var    -.1489113    .081997    -1.82   0.069    -.3096225    .0117999
     gdp_var    -11.75036   5.511399    -2.13   0.033     -22.5525   -.9482141
                                                                              
         rr5        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in country)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(13)     =          .
     overall = 0.3599                                         max =         11
     between = 1.0000                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.3139                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        209








Table 12 – Driscoll-Kraay Fixed Effects regression for rr5 
  
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.8790564
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     1.425478   .4108103     3.47   0.001     .6203046    2.230651
  fincrisis1    -.7574807   .4372902    -1.73   0.083    -1.614554    .0995924
 deficit_var    -.1401686   .0556005    -2.52   0.012    -.2491436   -.0311936
   debt2_var    -.1348819    .086097    -1.57   0.117    -.3036289    .0338651
     gdp_var    -4.050487   2.955993    -1.37   0.171    -9.844126    1.743153
                                                                              
         rr5        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in country)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0011
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =      18.28
     overall = 0.0845                                         max =         11
     between = 0.0636                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.0862                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        209
                                                                              
       _cons     1.338255   .2735736     4.89   0.000     .7634983    1.913012
  fincrisis1    -.6918022   .8004806    -0.86   0.399     -2.37355    .9899451
 deficit_var    -.1346906   .0540951    -2.49   0.023    -.2483401   -.0210411
   debt2_var    -.1363728   .0397947    -3.43   0.003    -.2199784   -.0527672
     gdp_var    -3.186069   2.829361    -1.13   0.275    -9.130336    2.758198
                                                                              
         rr5        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.0867
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =     22.41
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209








Table 14- Fixed Effects GLS regression for rr10 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.425478    .128385    11.10   0.000     1.155751    1.695205
  fincrisis1    -.7574807   .6454753    -1.17   0.256    -2.113574    .5986127
 deficit_var    -.1401686   .0615395    -2.28   0.035    -.2694584   -.0108789
   debt2_var    -.1348819   .0344786    -3.91   0.001    -.2073187   -.0624451
     gdp_var    -4.050487   1.639632    -2.47   0.024    -7.495226   -.6057471
                                                                              
         rr5        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 Root MSE          =    2.8494
                                                 R-squared         =    0.0845
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =     54.51
Method: Pooled OLS                               Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(18, 186) = 0.98                     Prob > F = 0.4873
                                                                              
         rho    .08693738   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3.8557591
     sigma_u    1.1897696
                                                                              
       _cons     2.327406   1.000227     2.33   0.021     .3541573    4.300654
  fincrisis1     -.697823   .9720413    -0.72   0.474    -2.615466     1.21982
 deficit_var    -.2143289   .0882801    -2.43   0.016    -.3884879   -.0401699
   debt2_var     -.153547   .0523517    -2.93   0.004    -.2568264   -.0502675
     gdp_var    -5.759129   5.659102    -1.02   0.310    -16.92341    5.405149
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0939                        Prob > F          =     0.0110
                                                F(4,186)          =       3.36
     overall = 0.0529                                         max =         11
     between = 0.0285                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.0675                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        209




Table 15 – Random Effects GLS regression for rr10 
 
  
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3.0891359
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     3.622181   .5548227     6.53   0.000     2.534749    4.709614
              
       2016             0  (omitted)
       2015     -.5380897   .8073175    -0.67   0.505    -2.120403    1.044224
       2014     -1.334186   .7568332    -1.76   0.078    -2.817552    .1491796
       2013     -2.017987   .8435816    -2.39   0.017    -3.671376   -.3645971
       2012      .1118879   .6270268     0.18   0.858    -1.117062    1.340838
       2011     -2.317284    1.07836    -2.15   0.032    -4.430831   -.2037376
       2010     -1.804964   .7282269    -2.48   0.013    -3.232263   -.3776655
       2009      .3105899   1.169497     0.27   0.791    -1.981582    2.602762
       2008      6.795535   1.517856     4.48   0.000     3.820592    9.770478
       2007      1.486659   1.151405     1.29   0.197    -.7700541    3.743372
        year  
              
      Spain     -.3155723   .3347261    -0.94   0.346    -.9716235    .3404788
   Slovenia     -1.852099   .2858929    -6.48   0.000    -2.412438   -1.291759
   Slovakia     -2.828678   .1775065   -15.94   0.000    -3.176584   -2.480771
   Portugal      .2558254   .3133524     0.82   0.414    -.3583341    .8699849
Netherlands     -1.143747   .0425394   -26.89   0.000    -1.227123   -1.060372
      Malta      -2.18078   .2297281    -9.49   0.000    -2.631039   -1.730521
 Luxembourg     -1.324816   .0974702   -13.59   0.000    -1.515854   -1.133778
  Lithuania     -1.613168   .1601376   -10.07   0.000    -1.927032   -1.299304
     Latvia     -.7124657   .2079355    -3.43   0.001    -1.120012   -.3049196
      Italy      1.357608   .1100072    12.34   0.000     1.141997    1.573218
    Ireland      1.106881   .2905431     3.81   0.000     .5374273    1.676335
     Greece      .2096479   .3598842     0.58   0.560    -.4957121    .9150079
    Germany     -1.122906   .1158794    -9.69   0.000    -1.350026   -.8957865
     France     -.7304154   .1179409    -6.19   0.000    -.9615753   -.4992554
    Finland     -.7863756   .0942958    -8.34   0.000     -.971192   -.6015592
    Estonia     -1.039658   .1294433    -8.03   0.000    -1.293362   -.7859538
     Cyprus     -.3076775   .1836693    -1.68   0.094    -.6676626    .0523076
    Belgium     -1.345169   .0265811   -50.61   0.000    -1.397267   -1.293071
     country  
              
  fincrisis1    -1.111362   .6666019    -1.67   0.095    -2.417878     .195154
 deficit_var     .0187395   .0869563     0.22   0.829    -.1516918    .1891707
   debt2_var    -.1387302   .0808034    -1.72   0.086    -.2971021    .0196416
     gdp_var    -13.52526   4.266132    -3.17   0.002    -21.88672   -5.163791
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in country)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(13)     =          .
     overall = 0.4743                                         max =         11
     between = 1.0000                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.4304                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        209




Table 16 - Random Effects GLS robust regression for rr10 
 
Table 17- Driscoll-Kraay Fixed Effects regression for rr10 
 
Table 18 - Driscoll-Kraay regression for rr10 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3.8557591
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons      2.70956   .5003291     5.42   0.000     1.728933    3.690187
  fincrisis1    -.9881023    .570593    -1.73   0.083    -2.106444    .1302394
 deficit_var    -.1867183   .0744998    -2.51   0.012    -.3327353   -.0407013
   debt2_var    -.1419517   .0868037    -1.64   0.102    -.3120839    .0281804
     gdp_var    -9.932975    3.51854    -2.82   0.005    -16.82919   -3.036763
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in country)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =      48.26
     overall = 0.0579                                         max =         11
     between = 0.0160                                         avg =       11.0
     within  = 0.0621                                         min =         11
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: country                         Number of groups  =         19
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        209
                                                                              
       _cons     2.327406   .3225675     7.22   0.000     1.649717    3.005095
  fincrisis1     -.697823   .9654493    -0.72   0.479    -2.726157    1.330511
 deficit_var    -.2143289   .1452818    -1.48   0.157    -.5195546    .0908968
   debt2_var     -.153547   .0487927    -3.15   0.006    -.2560565   -.0510374
     gdp_var    -5.759129   4.385992    -1.31   0.206    -14.97376    3.455499
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.0675
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0072
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =      4.95
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209
                                                                              
       _cons      2.70956   .1901008    14.25   0.000     2.310173    3.108947
  fincrisis1    -.9881023   .8567267    -1.15   0.264    -2.788018    .8118137
 deficit_var    -.1867183   .1465961    -1.27   0.219    -.4947053    .1212687
   debt2_var    -.1419517   .0294086    -4.83   0.000    -.2037368   -.0801666
     gdp_var    -9.932975   2.967685    -3.35   0.004    -16.16785     -3.6981
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 Root MSE          =    3.8519
                                                 R-squared         =    0.0579
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): country                      F(  4,    18)     =     31.71
Method: Pooled OLS                               Number of groups  =        19
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       209











Table 19 - Tobit regression for r0 
 









Table 21 - Tobit regression for rr10 
             0 right-censored observations
           120     uncensored observations
            89  left-censored observations at rr5 <= 0
                                                                              
      /sigma     2.651744   .3176857                      2.025394    3.278094
                                                                              
       _cons     1.709359   .3932503     4.35   0.000      .934025    2.484692
  fincrisis1    -.9277685   .4018146    -2.31   0.022    -1.719987   -.1355495
 deficit_var    -.2096171    .078015    -2.69   0.008    -.3634317   -.0558025
   debt2_var    -.1229548   .0442463    -2.78   0.006     -.210191   -.0357185
     gdp_var    -7.524316   4.068349    -1.85   0.066    -15.54549    .4968541
                                                                              
         rr5        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  -349.1203               Pseudo R2         =     0.0219
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0013
                                                F(   4,    205)   =       4.66
Tobit regression                                Number of obs     =        209
. 
             0 right-censored observations
           121     uncensored observations
            88  left-censored observations at r0 <= 0
                                                                              
      /sigma     1.568914   .1681056                      1.237476    1.900351
                                                                              
       _cons     .2110576   .3697176     0.57   0.569    -.5178789    .9399941
  fincrisis1     .2157352   .3335132     0.65   0.518    -.4418207     .873291
 deficit_var    -.0236797   .0398921    -0.59   0.553    -.1023312    .0549717
   debt2_var    -.0363472   .0280389    -1.30   0.196    -.0916289    .0189345
     gdp_var    -6.947604   3.674154    -1.89   0.060    -14.19158    .2963709
                                                                              
          r0        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  -287.7759               Pseudo R2         =     0.0178
                                                Prob > F          =     0.2532
                                                F(   4,    205)   =       1.35
Tobit regression                                Number of obs     =        209
. 
             0 right-censored observations
           126     uncensored observations
            83  left-censored observations at rr10 <= 0
                                                                              
      /sigma     4.280934   .4401995                      3.413035    5.148833
                                                                              
       _cons     2.721172   .6355213     4.28   0.000     1.468176    3.974168
  fincrisis1    -1.436031   .6385147    -2.25   0.026    -2.694929   -.1771332
 deficit_var    -.2543269   .1358781    -1.87   0.063    -.5222247    .0135709
   debt2_var    -.1423277   .0695148    -2.05   0.042    -.2793833   -.0052721
     gdp_var    -11.46232   5.538122    -2.07   0.040     -22.3813   -.5433423
                                                                              
        rr10        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -422.23697               Pseudo R2         =     0.0120
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0127
                                                F(   4,    205)   =       3.26
Tobit regression                                Number of obs     =        209
